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It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key
distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-
wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [L. Lydersen
et al., Nat. Photonics DOI:10.1038/nphoton.2010.214]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the
full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how
thermal effects in detectors under bright illumination can lead to the same outcome. We demonstrate
that the detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 can be blinded by heating the avalanche
photo diodes (APDs) using bright illumination, so-called thermal blinding. Further, the detectors
can be triggered using short bright pulses once they are blind. For systems with pauses between
packet transmission such as the plug-and-play systems, thermal inertia enables Eve to apply the
bright blinding illumination before eavesdropping, making her more difficult to catch.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
In theory quantum mechanics allows two parties, Al-
ice and Bob, to grow a private, secret key, even if the
eavesdropper Eve can do anything permitted by the laws
of nature [1–4]. The field of quantum key distribution
(QKD) has evolved rapidly in the last two decades, with
transmission distance increasing from a table top demon-
stration to over 250 km in the laboratory [5], and com-
mercial QKD systems available from several vendors[6].
However the components used for the experimental re-
alizations of QKD have imperfections. Numerous imper-
fections have been addressed in security proofs [7–12].
For some loopholes it took several years from their dis-
covery until they were covered by security proofs, for in-
stance the Trojan-horse [13, 14] loophole and detector
efficiency mismatch [15, 16]. The latter was exploited in
the time-shift attack [17] on a commercial QKD system
[18]. Other loopholes include a variety of side-channels
[19–22].
Common to the loopholes mentioned so far is that
they are not implementable in practice, or only leave
a marginal advantage for Eve. For instance, the im-
plementation of the time-shift attack [18] gave Eve an
information-theoretic advantage, allowing her to outper-
form a straight brute-force search for the key in 4% of
her attempts. In the practical phase-remapping attack
[22], Eve caused 19.7% QBER compromising merely the
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hardly ever used two-way post-processing protocol which
produces secure key at QBER up to 20% [23, 24].
There is however one class of attacks which stands
out in terms of implementability, Eve’s information and
QBER: The blinding attacks [25–27] are fully imple-
mentable with current technology, and give Eve the whole
raw key while causing zero additional QBER. In these
attacks, the APDs are tricked to exit the single-photon
sensitive Geiger mode, and are so-called blind. Eve uses
a copy of Bob’s apparatus to detect Alice’s signals, but
resends bright trigger pulses instead of single photons,
as in the after-gate attack [28]. When the detectors are
blind, Bob will only detect the bright trigger pulses if
he uses the same basis as Eve. Otherwise his detectors
remain silent. Hence Eve gets a full copy of the raw
key while causing no additional QBER. Both passively
quenched detectors [25], actively quenched detectors [26]
and the gated detectors of two commercially available
QKD systems [27] have been shown to be vulnerable to
blinding. In the case of the passively-quenched detectors,
this loophole has been exploited in the first full-scale im-
plementation of an eavesdropper [29], which was inserted
in the middle of the 290m transmission line in an exper-
imental entanglement-based QKD system [30, 31], and
recovered 100% of the raw key.
Previously the gated detectors in the commercially
available system Clavis2 from manufacturer ID Quan-
tique were subject to continuous-wave (CW) blinding
[27]. The blinding illumination caused the bias voltage at
the APDs to drop due to the presence of DC impedance
of the bias voltage supply, and therefore the APDs were
never in Geiger mode. In this paper we show how the
2same detectors, regardless of the impedance of the bias
voltage supply, can be blinded by heating the APD, so-
called thermal blinding. We show that thermal blinding
is more sophisticated form of attack than previously re-
ported CW-blinding [27] because the APD can be heated
well in advance of the detection times, and is as such
harder to catch. Especially for Clavis2, all the detector
parameters such as temperature of the cold plate, bias
voltage and APD current indicate single photon sensitiv-
ity while the detectors are in fact blind.
In this paper we first briefly review how APDs in the
linear mode can be exploited to eavesdrop on QKD sys-
tems (section II). Then the detector design in Clavis2 is
discussed (section III) before we show how it is possible
to thermally blind and trigger the detectors (section IV).
Finally we briefly discuss countermeasures in section V
and conclude in section VI.
II. EAVESDROPPING EXPLOITING APDs IN
LINEAR MODE
In this section we briefly review how APDs in the linear
mode can be exploited to eavesdrop on QKD systems
[26, 27].
In Geiger mode operation, an electron-hole pair pro-
duced by an absorbed single photon is amplified to a large
current in the APD, which exceeds a current compara-
tor threshold and reveals the photon’s presence. This is
referred to as a click [32].
In the linear mode however, when an APD is reverse-
biased at a constant voltage below the breakdown volt-
age [33], the current through the APD is proportional to
the incident optical power. Usually the APD is placed
in a resistive network, and also has an internal resis-
tance. Hence, the current through the APD lowers the
bias voltage, and the current through the APD is mono-
tonically increasing with the incident optical power. In
this regime, the comparator current threshold translates
to a classical optical power threshold [27].
If APDs are used as detectors in a QKD system, and
they are optically accessible to Eve when biased under
the breakdown voltage, Eve may eavesdrop on the QKD
system with an intercept-resend (faked-state [34]) attack.
Eve uses a copy of Bob to detect the qubits from Alice
in a random basis. Eve resends her detection results, but
instead of sending single photons she sends bright pulses,
just above the classical optical power threshold. Bob will
only have a detection event if his basis choice coincides
with Eve’s basis choice (see Fig. 1), otherwise no detector
clicks.
After the raw key exchange, Bob and Eve are identi-
cal both in bit values and basis choices. Since Eve uses
a copy of Bob’s detectors, Bob’s photon-number detec-
tion statistics is equal with or without Eve. Therefore
the attack works equally well on the BB84 protocol [1],
the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) [35] and
decoy-state BB84 protocols [36–38]. In addition to at-
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FIG. 1. The last beam splitter (BS) as well as the detectors in
a phase-encoded QKD system. I0 and I1 is the current run-
ning through APD 0/1, and Ith is the comparator threshold
current above which the detector registers a click. Here we
assume that the APDs are in the linear mode, and that Eve
sends a bright pulse slightly above the optical power thresh-
olds. a) Eve and Bob have selected matching bases. Therefore
the full intensity in the pulse from Eve hits detector 0. The
current caused by Eve’s pulse crosses the threshold current
and causes a click. b) Eve and Bob have selected opposite
bases. Therefore half the intensity of Eve’s pulse hits each
detector (corresponding to 50% detection probability in ei-
ther detector for single photons). This causes no click as the
current is below the threshold for each detector.
tacking the quantum channel, Eve listens on the classical
channel between Alice and Bob. Afterwards Eve per-
forms the same classical post-processing as Bob to obtain
the identical secret key.
Note that the classical optical power threshold has to
be sufficiently well defined for successful perfect eaves-
dropping. To be precise, let an optical power of P100%,i
or greater always cause a click when applied to detector
i. Likewise, let an optical power of P0%,i or less never
cause a click when applied to detector i. The sufficient
condition for Eve to be able to make any single detec-
tor click while none of the other detectors click, can be
expressed as
max
i
{
P100%,i
}
< 2
(
min
i
{
P0%,i
})
. (1)
III. DETECTOR DESIGN
A. Detector circuit
Figure 2 shows an equivalent detector bias and com-
parator circuit diagram for the detectors in Clavis2,
based on reverse engineering. The APD is biased just
above its breakdown voltage by the high voltage sup-
ply VHV,0 = −42.89V, VHV,1 = −43.08V. On top of
this bias the APD is gated with 2.8 ns TTL pulses every
200 ns from DD1 to create Geiger mode gates. The gates
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FIG. 2. Equivalent detector bias and comparator circuit.
Taps T1-T3 are analog taps of the APD gates (Vgate,0/1), the
APD bias (Vbias,0/1) and the comparator input (Vcomp,0/1).
The digital tap T4 of the detector output (Vclick,0/1) has
been converted to logic levels in all oscillograms. For the
experiments presented in section IV, the resistor R3 has been
shorted.
are applied as PECL signals from the mainboard, and
the buffer converts them to TTL levels, 0V and approx-
imately 3V. The anode of the APD is AC-coupled to a
fast comparator DA1 with the thresholds Vth,0 = 78mV
and Vth,1 = 82mV.
The normal operation of the detector circuit can be
seen in Fig. 3. A number of techniques have been de-
veloped for compensating the capacitive pulse through
APDs in the absence of an avalanche [39–42], but this
particular detector simply sets the comparator thresh-
olds above the amplitude of the capacitive pulse.
As a side note, applying CW illumination to the APD
allowed us to measure the timing of the quantum ef-
ficiency curve within the gate quite precisely, see Ap-
pendix B.
B. Detector cooling
To reduce the probability of dark counts, APDs are
usually cooled to a low temperature. The two APDs in
this QKD system are cooled together by one 4-stage ther-
moelectric cooler (TEC) (Osterm PE4-115-14-15 [43]).
The system software reports the temperature measured
by a thermistor mounted on the cold side of the top stage
(cold plate), and close to where the APDs are mounted.
Note that the cold plate temperature is not always the
same as the APD chip temperature, as there is actually
a quite substantial thermal resistance between the two.
This will become an important point in section IVB. The
hot side of the TEC is mounted on a large heatsink with
a fan, such that it stays at approximately room temper-
ature.
The temperature of the cold plate is maintained at a
pre-set value by a closed-loop controller that adjusts the
TEC current. When the system is switched on, the cold
plate (and thus the APDs) is first cooled to the target
temperature, −50 ◦C. The system will not start opera-
tion unless the cold plate settles at a temperature below
−49.8 ◦C. After this initial check however, during system
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FIG. 3. An example of electrical signals during two gates in
detector 1 without any illumination. In the first gate thermal
fluctuations or trapped carriers have caused an avalanche, and
a click at the comparator output (dark count). A typical am-
plitude of the avalanche peak is 200mV for detector 0 and
300mV for detector 1. Normally the system removes 50 gates
after a detection event, but for this oscillogram this feature
has been disabled. In the second gate there is no detection
event. When no current runs through the APD, it is equiv-
alent to a capacitor, and thus approximately the derivative
of the gate pulse shape propagates to the comparator input,
with peak positive amplitude ≈ 35mV.
operation, there seems to be no future checks of the cold
plate temperature, even if the controller is unable to keep
it at the target value.
IV. BLINDING AND CONTROL
Blinding is achieved when the system is insensitive to
single photons. This can be achieved by ensuring that
the APD bias voltage is below the breakdown voltage, or
by lowering the voltage in front of the comparator such
that the avalanche current does not cross the compara-
tor threshold. The detectors are controllable if they are
accessible to Eve in the linear mode with a sufficiently
well defined classical optical power click threshold, as in
Eq. 1.
We have previously reported that blinding Clavis2 can
be achieved by CW illumination due to the bias voltage
supply impedance R3 = 1 kΩ, which makes the bias volt-
age drop to a level where the APD is never in Geiger
mode [27], even inside the gate.
One fast and easy countermeasure could be to use
a low-impedance bias voltage source in the detectors.
Therefore, in this paper we consider a modified ver-
sion of the detectors with R3 shorted (see Fig. 2). We
present three different blinding techniques which may be
used against detectors with a low-impedance bias voltage
source, and show that the detectors can be controlled by
trigger pulses in the blind state. The technique in sec-
tion IVA clearly works against high-impedance biased
4detectors as well as against low-impedance biased detec-
tors since it has been demonstrated [27]. The difference
is that with a low-impedance bias voltage source, the
blinding originates from thermal effects instead of bias
voltage drop. The technique in section IVB has been
used on low-impedance biased detectors, but we see no
reason why it should not work similarly well against the
unmodified high-impedance biased detectors. The tech-
nique in section IVC has been used on both high- and
low-impedance biased detectors, but we only present the
results for the low-impedance biased detectors in this pa-
per.
A. Thermal CW-blinding
It turns out that it is possible to blind also low-
impedance biased detectors (R3 = 0) by CW illumina-
tion. When an APD is illuminated, the power dissi-
pated in the APD is transformed to heat, which may
increase the APD temperature. The breakdown voltage
is temperature dependent: increasing the temperature
increases the breakdown voltage. Since the bias voltage
is constant, this makes the APD leave the Geiger mode.
Two effects contribute to the power dissipation: electri-
cal heating (VAPD · IAPD) and the small contribution by
the absorption of the optical power. For the heat dissipa-
tion calculations, we simply assume that all the optical
power is absorbed and transformed to heat. Figure 4
shows how the heat dissipation increases with the optical
illumination.
When the sum of the heat dissipations of the two de-
tectors is approximately 300mW, the cooling system is
running at its maximum capacity with a TEC current of
about ITEC = 2.37A (the air temperature at the heatsink
fan intake at this time was 23.6 ◦C). When the optical il-
lumination is increased beyond this point, the cold plate
(and thus APD) temperature starts to increase. Figure 5
shows how the temperature of the cold plate increases
with the total amount of heat dissipated in the APDs.
When the optical illumination, and thus the load is in-
creased beyond the maximum capacity of the TEC, the
cold plate temperature increases approximately linearly
with the heat dissipated by the APD. While not in the
specifications of this specific TEC [43], other data sheets
of similar TECs [44] show that the temperature differ-
ence between the hot and cold plate decreases linearly
with respect to the load, given a constant TEC current.
When the temperature of the APDs increases, the
breakdown voltage also increases with the coefficient of
about 0.1V/K [45]. In this experiment we illuminated
both detectors simultaneously, to get sufficient tempera-
ture increase without risking a permanent damage to the
APDs. We used a fibre-optic coupler (see appendix A
for the experimental setup) to illuminate both detectors,
with 46.75%/53.25% of the optical power going to detec-
tor 0/1. This is approximately equal to the measured
splitting ratio for the beam splitter in front of the detec-
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FIG. 4. Calculated heat dissipation (based on measured APD
current and voltage) versus the optical illumination for each
of the two detectors.
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FIG. 5. The temperature of the cold plate and TEC current
reported by the software, versus the total amount of heat
dissipated in the APDs. It takes several minutes for the cold
plate temperature to stabilize at a new value (hotter than
−50 ◦C) after the power dissipation in the APDs is changed.
tors in the system, when illuminated through the short
arm of the interferometer [46–48].
Fig. 6 shows the click probability versus the CW il-
lumination of the two detectors. The click probability
drops below the normal dark count probability (about
10−4), before it becomes exactly zero when the illumina-
tion exceeds 8.8mW and 10mW at the detectors. In the
experiment the blinding caused clicks for several minutes
before the APDs were properly heated. However, the
blinding only needs to be turned on once, afterwards Eve
remains undetected.
After the cold plate has been heated by APD illumina-
tion, it takes several tens of seconds before it cools to the
target temperature of −50 ◦C. Therefore, the detectors
stay blind for some time after the CW blinding illumina-
tion is turned off. Detectors 0 and 1 regain dark counts
when the cold plate (and thus the APDs) becomes colder
than −39.8 ◦C and −40.1 ◦C, respectively.
To verify that the detectors could be controlled, the
detectors were blinded with 9.5mW at detector 0 and
10.7mW at detector 1, and controlled by superimposing
50 + 0 2.3 + 2.7 4.6 + 5.4 6.9 + 8.1 9.2 + 10.8
0
1
Optical illumination of detector 0 + 1, mW
C
lic
k
 p
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
10
−2
10
−4
10
−6
10
−8
Detector 0
Detector 1
FIG. 6. Click probability versus power of CW illumination
applied to both detectors simultaneously.
TABLE I. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click
probability thresholds, in CW thermal blinding mode.
Detector
Click probabilities
0 % 100 %
0 1.12mW 1.31mW
1 1.71mW 2.02mW
a 3 ns long laser pulse slightly after the gate. The click
probability thresholds are listed in table I. The thresh-
olds satisfy Eq. 1, and thus the eavesdropping method
described in section II should be possible when the de-
tectors are thermally blinded by CW illumination.
After observing thermal blinding in this experi-
ment, we realized that this could be the reason why
the PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR actively-quenched detec-
tor module remained blind at bright pulse frequencies
above 400 kHz, despite no substantial bias voltage drop
[26]. Therefore we did more precise measurements which
confirm that PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR can be thermally
blinded [49].
B. Thermal blinding of frames
As this QKD system is of plug-and-play type, it sends
the qubits in packets called frames to avoid Rayleigh
back-scattered photons to arrive during the gates and
increase the QBER [46, 50]. For our experiment we used
1072 qubits per frame [51]. With a 200 ns bit period this
makes the frame length 214.4µs. The break in between
the frames varies with the fibre length between Alice and
Bob, but is always longer than the frame itself. In our
experiment we simply used a 250µs frame break, which
makes a total frame + break period of 464.4µs.
It turns out that the APD chip and the inner parts
immediately touching it (not the APD package and not
the cold plate) act as a thermal reservoir on the frame
period time scale. Therefore bright illumination between
the frames heats the APD sufficiently that it stays blind
throughout the whole frame. Based on the optical power
where the frames went blind, and the average current
through the APDs, the thermal resistance between each
APD chip and the cold plate is estimated to be at least
190K/W.
To heat the APDs we used 225µs long pulses timed
in between the frames and fired at both APDs simulta-
neously. The whole frame went blind at approximately
1.5mW and 1.7mW pulse power at detector 0 and 1
respectively. The oscillograms in Fig. 7 show the electri-
cal and optical signals in detector 1 when frames of 1072
gates are thermally blinded by the 225µs long pulses with
3.5mW in-pulse power at detector 0, and 4mW in-pulse
power at detector 1. While the system was blind, the
cold plate temperature reading was −49.5 ◦C, and the
TEC was running well below its maximum capacity at
ITEC = 2.006A.
To verify that the detectors could be controlled, we
checked the response to a 4 ns long control pulse timed
slightly after the gate of one of the first bits of the frame,
and the last bit of the frame. The detection probability
thresholds for the second [52] and the last bit are given
in tables II and III. Figure 8 shows oscillograms from
detector 1 when it is blinded and controlled in the second
bit of the frame.
The click probability thresholds in tables II and III
each satisfy Eq. 1 individually. However, P0%,0 in the
last bit of the frame is less than 1/2 of P100%,1 in the
second bit of the frame. This means that the control
pulse power would have to be decreased throughout the
frame. Since the second and the last bit of the frame
can be controlled, it is plausible that the eavesdropping
method described in section II could be applied to any
bit of the frame.
What is remarkable about this blinding method is that
due to the low thermal conductivity between the APD
chip and the cold plate, as well as the thermal inertia
of the nearby parts, the cold plate thermistor reports a
value very close to the normal value. Therefore moni-
toring the cold plate temperature would not suffice to
prevent thermal blinding.
TABLE II. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click
probability thresholds for the second bit in the frame, when
the frame is thermally blinded.
Detector
Click probabilities
0 % 100 %
0 401µW 533µW
1 580µW 747µW
TABLE III. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click
probability thresholds for the last bit in the frame, when the
frame is thermally blinded.
Detector
Click probabilities
0 % 100 %
0 305µW 420µW
1 340µW 532µW
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FIG. 7. Thermal blinding of frames. The oscillograms show
electrical and optical signals when frames of 1072 gates in de-
tector 1 are thermally blinded by a 225µs blinding pulse, with
3.5mW pulse power at detector 0, and 4mW pulse power at
detector 1. The blinding pulse causes a detection event out-
side the frame, where the system probably does not register
clicks (If the click is registered, it could easily be avoided by
increasing the power of the blinding pulse gradually, such that
the comparator input AC-coupling keeps the voltage below
the comparator threshold).
C. Sinkhole blinding
It is natural to ask whether the framed blinding tech-
nique can be applied at the single gate level, i.e. what
happens if bright illumination is applied between adja-
cent gates? It turns out that this also leads to blinding,
but not primarily due to thermal effects. Since the com-
parator input is AC-coupled (see Fig. 2), the signal at the
input of the comparator has the same area over and un-
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FIG. 8. Detector control during thermal blinding of frames.
The oscillograms show electrical and optical signals when
frames of 1072 gates in detector 1 are thermally blinded by a
225µs blinding pulse, with 3.5mW pulse power at detector 0,
and 4mW pulse power at detector 1, and the detector is con-
trolled by a 4 ns long control pulse timed slightly after the
second gate in the frame. In the upper and lower left sets of
oscillograms, the 580µW control pulse never causes any click.
In the lower right set, the control pulse is applied after the
same gate in the frame, but now its increased 747µW peak
power always causes a click.
der 0V level when averaged over time much longer than
R4 ·C1 = 165 ns. Thus by sending long bright pulses be-
tween the gates and no illumination near the gate, it is
possible to superimpose a negative-voltage pulse at the
comparator input at the gate time. We call this negative
pulse a sinkhole. An avalanche that occurs within it can
have a normal amplitude yet remain below the compara-
tor threshold level.
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FIG. 9. Sinkhole blinding. The oscillograms show electrical
and optical signals when detector 1 is blinded by a 500µW,
140 ns long laser pulse in between the gates. The avalanche
amplitude is about 130mV and would cause a click if it were
not sitting in the negative-voltage pulse. It seems that the re-
duction in avalanche amplitude (compare to Fig. 3) is caused
by heating of the APD, which effectively rises the breakdown
voltage.
TABLE IV. Control pulse peak power at 0 % and 100 % click
probability thresholds, during sinkhole blinding.
Detector
Click probabilities
0 % 100 %
0 655µW 751µW
1 773µW 908µW
Using a 140 ns long pulse beginning about 25 ns af-
ter the gate, detector 0 becomes completely blind when
Plaser > 205µW, and detector 1 becomes blind when
Plaser > 400µW. To keep both detectors blind, Plaser =
500µW is used subsequently. When a large pulse is ap-
plied between the gates, the detector will always expe-
rience a dark count in the gate due to trapped carri-
ers. Figure 9 shows detector 1 blinded by a 140 ns long,
500µW bright pulse, starting about 25 ns after the gate.
Initially when the blinding pulses are turned on, there
is a transient with about 20-100 clicks, which would be
easily detectable in post-processing. Note again that the
blinding only needs to be turned on once, and that the
blinding can be turned on before the raw key exchange
to avoid the clicks being registered.
Detector control is obtained by a 3.2 ns long laser pulse
timed shortly after the gate. The click probability thresh-
olds found are listed in Table IV. Figure 10 shows os-
cillograms from detector 1 when it is blind and con-
trolled. Once again, the thresholds in table IV satisfy
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FIG. 10. Detector control during sinkhole blinding. The os-
cillograms show electrical and optical signals when detector 1
is blinded with a 500µW, 140 ns long laser pulse in between
the gates, and controlled with a 3.2 ns long laser pulse timed
shortly after the gate. To the left, the 773µW control pulse
never causes any click. To the right, the 908µW control pulse
always causes a click.
Eq. 1, and thus the eavesdropping method described in
section II should be possible when the detectors are sink-
hole blinded.
V. DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURES
First of all, the numerous detectors proved blindable
and controllable [25–27, 29, 49], and the large number
of independent blinding methods available show that
avoiding this loophole is non-trivial. Further the results
presented in this paper clearly show that reducing the
impedance of the bias voltage supply is far from being a
sufficient countermeasure for this detector design.
At this point it is not clear to us how to design hack-
proof detectors. The most obvious countermeasure is to
monitor the optical power at Bob’s entrance with an ad-
ditional detector. However it is not obvious that this
actually closes the loophole; as pointed out previously
the click threshold close to the gate may be very low, al-
lowing for practically non-detectable control pulses [27].
Thus it is not clear how to set the threshold value for
the entrance monitor; in any case the threshold should
be derived from and incorporated into a security proof.
It would also be crucial that this monitoring detector is
not blindable.
For the passively quenched scheme it has been pro-
posed previously to monitor APD parameters such as
APD bias voltage, current and temperature [25]. How-
8ever, the results in section IVB show that normal APD
parameters do not necessarily guarantee single photon
sensitivity: for thermal blinding of frames all the APD
parameters report normal values during the frames while
the detectors are in fact blind.
It is worth emphasizing that the loophole opens when
Eve drives the detectors into an abnormal operating
regime, namely the linear mode. However, there are also
quantum detectors which are actually designed to oper-
ate in linear mode. For example, homodyne detectors
used in continuous-variable QKD [53, 54] are probably
not susceptible to the described attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
The detectors in the Clavis2 QKD system have proved
to be blindable by a variety of methods, even with a low-
impedance bias voltage supply. Further, the detectors
can always be controlled in the blind state. This allows
eavesdropping on the QKD system, using the method de-
scribed in section II. Since Eve may use an exact copy of
Bob’s system, no parameters currently available to Bob
reveal Eve’s presence. In practice, this should allow for
perfect eavesdropping where Eve has an exact copy of
Bob’s raw key, and thus can extract the full secret key.
The eavesdropping strategy described in section II has
been implemented and used to capture 99.8% of the raw
key in a 290m experimental entanglement-based QKD
system [29]. We see no practical difficulties implement-
ing the same eavesdropper for this commercial QKD sys-
tem, using off-the-shelf components. Actually we have
proposed a plug-and-play eavesdropper scheme [27] for
easy deployment.
Many detectors have already been proved blindable
and controllable by Eve [25–27], and the large variety
of blinding methods available for the system tested could
probably be used on other detector designs as well. While
it is relatively easy to design a countermeasure that pre-
vents blinding attacks with the specific parameters cho-
sen in the present work, it is unclear to us how to build
generic secure detectors.
This work further emphasizes the importance of thor-
oughly investigating the non-idealities of each component
in a QKD system, as well as battle-testing the system as
a whole.
ID Quantique has been notified about the loophole
prior to this publication, and has implemented counter-
measures.
Appendix A: Measurement setup
Figure 11 shows the measurement setup used for this
experiment. The trigger signal is tapped directly from
the PECL gate signal (before DD1 in Fig. 2).
When pump current is used to control the power of
the laser, the pulse width will vary slightly with the peak
(1536.22 nm)
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FIG. 11. The setup used in the experiment. Both detectors
were illuminated simultaneously by inserting a 50/50 fibre-
optic coupler (not shown in the diagram) before the APDs.
power. In our experiment, the observed change in pulse
width is less than 10 % after doubling the laser power.
Also, the comparator threshold does not seem to be sig-
nificantly dependent on the pulse width, thus we consider
our results valid despite this small change in the laser
pulse width.
Appendix B: Direct measurement of quantum
efficiency
When CW illumination is applied to the APD, the
applied electrical gate “propagates” to the comparator
input. This might be caused by a change in linear mul-
tiplication coefficient caused by the electrical gate. This
allowed us to measure the quantum efficiency mapped in-
side the “propagated” gate with about 200 ps precision.
The single photon sensitivity was measured using a
id300 short-pulsed laser attenuated to a mean photon
number of 1 per pulse. The quantum efficiency η was de-
rived from the data assuming that the detector is linear
(i.e. that an n-photon state is detected with probability
1 − (1 − η)n). The timing of the photon arrival at the
APD relative to the applied gate was aligned by observ-
ing a response to unattenuated laser pulse on top of the
2.1mW CW illumination. Figure 12 shows the result of
the measurement on detector 1.
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FIG. 12. Quantum efficiency measured directly within the
electrical gate for detector 1. The photon sensitivity drops
about 1 ns before the falling edge of the gate, because
avalanches that start late do not have time to develop a large
enough current to cross the comparator threshold.
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